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CASE COMMENTS
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF SUBDIVIDING REAL ESTATE
A taxpayer selling securities through a broker who sells in one or
several lots obtains capital gain treatment with a maximum tax rate of
25 per cent when the securities are held longer than six months.1 The
taxpayer who sells real estate through a real estate agent who sub-
divides the tract in order to sell in lots cannot so confidently expect to
receive capital gain treatment.2 The tax treatment may depend upon
the circuit in which the case arises and, since 1954, upon whether
section 12373 is applicable to the taxpayer or not. The Code definition
of a capital asset is little assistance to the taxpayer.4 Real property
is a capital asset unless it is "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."6 Because
of this last provision a taxpayer may be surprised to find that the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue has considered him to be in the real
estate business and has treated his gain as ordinary income.6
Achong v. Commissioner7 illustrates the extent to which the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit goes in upholding a finding that a tax-
payer has gone into the real estate business and that the sale of lots from
a subdivided tract is a sale in the ordinary course of his trade or
business.
The taxpayer in this case acquired in 1923 the small tract of land on
which he was living. He has lived there since, and during these years
has been employed as a cashier in a meat market. He has never owned
any other real estate and has never been engaged in the real estate
business. In 1946 he entered into an agreement with King, a real estate
agent, for subdivision and sale of most of the tract of land. The terms
of the agreement gave the taxpayer a substantial power of control in
several important aspects over the actions of. the real estate agent. The
"U.S. Treas. Reg. xi8, § 39.22(c)-5 (1953); Comment, 29 So. Calif. L. Rev. 116, 119
(1955).
-Grogan, Capital Gains v. Ordinary Income, 3o Taxes 574, 585 (1952).
OInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237.
'Id. § 1221.
11d. § 1221(1).
OCompare Brown v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1946); Ehrman v.
Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (gth Cir. 1941); Welch v. Solomon, 99 F.2d 41 (9th
Cir. 1938); and Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1936), with Dunlap
v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1950); Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d
315 (5th Cir. 1947); Three States Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 61 (7th Cir.
1946); Guthrie v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Okla. 1947); Sparks v. United States,
55 F. Supp. 941 (M.D. Ga. 1944); W. T. Thrift, Sr., 15 T.C. 366 (195o); and Thompson
Lumber Co., 43 B.T.A. 726 (1941).
246 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1957).
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taxpayer took no part in the solicitation of prospects or in the sale of the
lots. King did not advertise the property but contacted parties he
thought might be interested. The taxpayer contended that he had not
entered the real estate business; but the Court of Appeals upheld the
Commissioner's contention that the taxpayer went into business through
his agent, basing its finding upon the degree of control retained by the
taxpayer.
The decision seems to represent an extreme application of section
12 21(1)8 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the type of holding
of which Congress disapproved in enacting section 1237 of the 1954
Code.
In Ehrman v. Commissioner,9 decided in 1941, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit found that the taxpayers were in the real estate
business and that the gain was ordinary. Here, the taxpayers, heirs to
the land, had sold the tract as a whole but bought it back at a trustee's
sale. They continued the subsidivision started by the mortgagor-buyer,
sold a number of lots, and reported the gain as long-term capital gain.
Their contention that the purpose of continuing the subdivision and
sale of lots was to liquidate a capital asset was not considered control-
ling.' 0 The court said, "The sole question is were the taxpayers in the
business of subdividing real estate?"" This case represents the extreme
positions sometimes taken by the Ninth Circuit.12
The extremity of the holding in the principal case can be pointed
up readily and effectively by comparing the facts and holding with
those of similar cases in other circuits. The courts are guided by sev-
eral factors in determining whether a sale of real estate is the sale of a
capital asset or of property held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of trade or business.13 These are judicially approved guides
to be taken into account, although no single test is determinative of the
question. The factors are as follows: (i) the intent of the taxpayer;
(2) history and use of the property involved; (3) the purpose of the
8Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a)()(A).
'12o F.2d 607 (9 th Cir. 1941).
"°The Ninth Circuit has been consistent in considering the intent of liquidation
of a capital asset as not controlling. See Pool v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 233, 236
(9 th Cir. 1957).
"120 F.2d at 61o.
"See note 15 infra.
"Williamson v. Commissioner, 2oi F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1953); Friend v. Commis-
sioner, 198 F.2d 285 (1oth Cir. 1952); Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714
(ioth Cir. 1952); Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 195o);
Reis v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 9oo (6th Cir. 1944); Greene v. Commissioner, 141
F.2d 645 (sth Cir. 1944); W. T. Thrift, Sr., 15 T.C. 366 (195o). See also Grogan,
Capital Gains v. Ordinary Income, 3o Taxes 574, 585 (1952).
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acquisition, holding, and disposition of the property; (4) the lapse of
time between the acquisition and sale; (5) the general conduct of the
operation: the number, frequency, and continuity of transactions; the
extent or substantiality of the transactions; and (6) the activities of
the taxpayer or those acting for him in promoting sales, such as (a)
making improvements to real property or (b) advertising the property
to attract purchasers.14
The application of these factors has resulted in such diversity of
holdings in the different circuits as to amount to conflict.' 5 Several
circuits have retained some of the dictionary meaning of the words
found in section 1221(1) of the 1954 Code, while the Ninth seems to
have given the words a peculiar meaning.' 6 The following comparison
of the facts and holdings in three different circuits when the same
question is involved will show that the present case is an extreme
holding. The two cases chosen to be compared with Achong are Smith
v. Dunn,'7 decided in the Fifth Circuit, and Three States Lumber Co.
v. Commissioner,18 decided in the Seventh Circuit. The order of the
facts in the present case and in those chosen for comparison and the
tests set forth in the preceding paragraph have been placed in parallel.
The tests and the parallel facts in each case are preceded by the same
number or letter. The reader can thereby readily determine by cross
reference and comparison of the facts and tests the soundness of the
contention that the Ninth Circuit holding in the Achong case is ex-
treme.
Achong v. Commissioner. (i) The avowed intention of the taxpayer
was liquidation of a capital asset. (2) He acquired the land through
a homestead agreement and he lived on the land and rented it for
farming. (3) He acquired the land for his residential and farming
purposes. (4) He lived on the land prior to acquiring it and, since ac-
quiring it, has held it for twenty-three years. (5) The taxpayer had
"See note 13 supra.
"Compare Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (gth Cir. 1941), with Dillon
v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1954); Home Co. v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d
637 (0oth Cir. 1954); Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (sth Cir. 195o);
Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1947); Guthrie v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 784
(W.D. Okla. 1947); Sparks v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 941 (M.D. Ga. 1944); W. T.
Thrift, Sr., 15 T.C. 366 (1950); Thompson Lumber CO., 43 B.T.A. 726 (1941). Also
compare Curtis Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1957); Chandler v. United
States, 226 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1955); and Dillon v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 218
(8th Cir. 1954), with Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 19o F.2d 263 (9th Cir.
1951), and with McGah v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 769 (gth Cir. 1954).
"'See note 15 supra.
17224 F.2d 353 (5 th Cir. 1955).
28158 F.2d 61 (7 th Cir. 1946).
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never previously sold any lots or held any other property for sale,
and the extent of the sales was the selling of most of the 1 1.5 acres
over a two-year period. (6) The taxpayer was a full-time cashier in a
meat market during all the time he held the land, but he hired an
agent to sell the land and maintained control over the actions of the real
estate agent in relation to the subdivision in several important aspects.
It appears that (a) the sales were made by representing that improve-
ments would be constructed and that (b) there was no advertising by
either the taxpayer or his agent. In holding against the taxpayer, the
activity of the agent was imputed to the taxpayer and the avowed
intent of liquidation was given no weight.
Smith v. Dunn. (i) The taxpayers' avowed intent was liquida-
tion of a capital asset. (2) He inherited the land and made no use of
it. (3) He had no purpose of acquisition. (4) He held the land fifty
years. (5) There were fifty-one lots sold in two years, but there had
been no previous selling activity by the taxpayer. (6) The taxpayer
was a full-time architect and hired an agent to subdivide and sell the
lots. He had the right of control over his agent but did not exercise
it. As to the activities of the taxpayer: (a) the improvements on the
tract amounted to $32,ooo, a sum nearly equal to the taxpayer's basis in
the land, and (b) the agent carried on a continuous advertising cam-
paign. The court held that this taxpayer sold a capital asset and allowed
him to treat his income as long-term capital gain. The contentions
of the taxpayer that his intent was to liquidate and that the agent was
an independent contractor 19 weighed heavily in his favor.2 0
Three States Lumber Co. v. Commissioner. (i) The taxpayer's in-
tent in subdividing and selling was liquidation of an asset. (2) The
taxpayer had bought large areas of land for the timber thereon. (3) He
cut the timber and sawed it into lumber. (4) He last bought land in
1914; in 1922 he started selling the land and he continued until 1935.
(5) He sold tracts ranging from ten acres to 3,2oo acres in size over a
period of thirteen years. (6) The taxpayer hired one employee who
worked full-time until 1929 and half-time thereafter in selling lots. To
"In Pool v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 233, 237 (9th Cir. 1957), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit cites Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir.
1938) , a Fifth Circuit decision, to support the contention that one may go into the
real estate business through an agent. Considering the liberality shown by the Fifth
Circuit to taxpayers and the conservatism shown by the Ninth, this situation at
first glance seems ironical. But when one reads the Snell case, he finds an ovenvhelm-
ing case against the taxpayer. The extent of the activities of the taxpayer in the
Snell case was much greater than that of the taxpayer in the Achong case. The de-
cision against the taxpayer in Snell is readily accepted as just. See Three States
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 61, 64 (7th Cir. 1946).
"OSee 224 F.2d at 357.
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assist this man he employed a bookkeeper-stenographer and another
man who spent his time in the office on the property, showing the
land at times to prospective purchasers. The taxpayer (a) surveyed
tracts when necessary in connection with sales and frequently loaned
money for purchase of equipment and planting of crops to people
with whom he had contracted to sell or lease land, and (b) he ran some
newspaper advertising in 1923 and placed some posters on the land
itself. The court, in holding that the taxpayer had sold a capital asset,
said the facts were consistent only with a desire to liquidate a capital
asset.
21
Under section 1237 of the 1954 Code it would seem that the tax-
payer's gain in the Achong case on the sale of lots would be long-term
capital gain. The provisions of section 1237 can be summarized and
their applicability to the facts in the instant case stated as follows:
22
i. A taxpayer will not be deemed to have gone into the real estate
business merely because he subdivides and sells lots from a tract of
land if the tract has been held for five years or was acquired by in-
heritance or devise; and he can treat the gain from the first five lots
wholly as capital gain, if: (a) the lots or tract had not been previously
held for sale to customers or if the taxpayer, in the year in question,
holds no other real estate for sale to customers; (b) no substantial
improvement has been made by the taxpayer while he has held the
real estate or is made pursuant to a contract of sale between the buyer
and taxpaper.
In the year the sixth and subsequent lots are sold 95 per cent of
the gain is treated as capital gain (unless five years elapses between the
sale of the fifth lot and the sixth), but 5 per cent is treated as ordinary
income. The 5 per cent is an amount comparable to a broker's fee
and is presumably the amount realized from selling activity. Expenses
of selling are to be deducted first from the 5 per cent ordinary gain
and then from the capital gain.23
2It is noticeable from this comparison that in every instance but one the
parallel facts are more adverse to the position of the taxpayers in the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits. This exception is that the taxpayer in the present case did control
the activities of his agent more than the taxpayer did in the Fifth Circuit case.
But it should not be overlooked that the taxpayer in the Seventh Circuit case
hired employees for the specific job of selling lots and he had complete control
over their activities. Furthermore, as will be pointed out, under § 1237 this fact
of control is of consequence no longer.
-Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1237; Alexander, Federal Taxation § 1315 (21st ed.
1957); Comment, 29 So. Calif. L. Rev. 116, 121 (1955).
n'he result is that if the taxpayer does his own selling the 5% is ordinary
income realized from the selling activity, and if he has a broker sell the lots the
5% goes to pay his fees and the 95% is all gain as it would have been under the
old law. Comment, 29 So. Calif. L. Rev. 116, 123 0955).
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2. The section further provides that no improvement shall be
deemed a substantial improvement if the lot or parcel is held by the
taxpayer for a period of ten years and if: (a) such improvement is
the building or installation of water, sewer, or drainage facilities or
roads; (b) such improvement is satisfactorily shown to have been neces-
sary to make the lot marketable at prevailing local prices for similar
building sites; and (c) the taxpayer elects to make no adjustment to the
basis of the lot or parcel, or of any other property owned by the taxpay-
er, on account of expenditures for such improvement.
The limitations upon improvements in section 1237 and in the
case law are to prevent a taxpayer from realizing capital gain treat-
ment on profits resulting from substantial investment in improve-
ments on a tract or lot. It would seem that even unimproved lots
are denied the benefit of favorable tax treatment if the improve-
ment on an adjacent lot is so substantial as to raise the value of the
adjoining unimproved lots. 24
The court in the Achong case noted but gave little consideration to
the nature of the improvements which the taxpayer represented would
be made.25 These improvements were not made while the taxpayer
held the lots and were not made pursuant to a contract of sale.26 The
taxpayer had held the property for more than ten years and under the
1954 Code could have made substantial improvements and still not
have been considered in the real estate business, if he could show that
the improvements were the type enumerated in section 1237, if they
were needed to make the lots marketable at prevailing prices, and if
he did not elect to adjust the basis in this or other property. There
seems to be little doubt that under section 1237 this taxpayer would
have been able to control the activities of his agent and to make sub-
stantial improvements and still be able to treat his gain as long-term
capital gain.
The Committee on Finance, referring to section 1237, stated: "It is
a new section which permits an individual who is not otherwise a real
estate dealer (as the result of his engaging in the business of selling
other real property to customers) to dispose of a tract of real property,
held for investment purposes, by sub-dividing it without necessarily
being treated as a real estate dealer with respect to all of his long term
21S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 d Cong., 2d Sess. 441, 442 (1954). However, ,a substantial
improvement of a portion of a tract may be made which does not substantially
increase the value of the remainder of the lots in the tract, although it may enhance
their salability, such as would probably be the case where the taxpayer simply erects
his personal residence on one of the lots in the tract.
' 2 4 6 F.2d at 446.
Ibid.
